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Abstract
There exists a wide variety of tax treatments of pensions across the world. And the
reasons for such a range of regimes are not clear. This note reviews the general principles
of pension taxes and analyses the theoretical foundations of why pension incomes ought
to be taxed specically. To do this, one has to distinguish between public and private
pensions. The design of public pensions cannot be separated from the one of taxation.
Regarding private pensions, the key issue is whether or not pension saving ought to be
treated di¤erently from other forms of saving.
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1 Introduction
There exists a wide variety of tax treatment of pensions across the world. And the
reasons for such a range of regimes are not clear. This note reviews the general principles
of pension taxes and analyses the theoretical foundations of why pension incomes ought
to be taxed specically. At rst sight, the issue at hand could be restricted to the way
pension benets ought to be taxed at the time they are paid out. The question would
then be whether those pensions should benet from a tax break relative to other types of
income, which is the case in a number of countries. Another related question pertains to
the possibility of combining pensions and labor income. For a long time, earning labor
income while receiving public pension was not allowed. This is part of the earnings test
issue; see Cremer et al. (2008b). Combining earnings and private pensions was never a
problem.
Focusing on the stage at which pension benets are paid out gives only a partial
view of the underlying issues. It is more relevant to consider the di¤erent stages in
which pensions are involved, namely, the stage of contribution, for funded schemes, the
stage of capital income accruals and nally the stage of paying out. Also it is essential
to study the relation between pension systems and the labor market, more specically,
the retirement decision.
As far as public pensions (social security in the US terminology) are concerned, it
is not conceivable to separate the benet side from the revenue side. Actually, benets
can just be seen as negative taxes and vice-versa. Both social security benets and
contributions inuence the whole life cycle of individuals and more particularly their
saving, working and retirement decisions. Furthermore the issue of taxation of social
security benets is rather articial. What matters for the retired persons is their net
income and this can be determined as part of the optimal allocation. The separation
into gross income and taxes is purely a matter of implementation and is of no relevance
for optimal policy design.
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2 The taxation of private pension funds
Three transactions constitute the process of saving, each of which provides an opportu-
nity to collect taxes: (i) when part of the income is saved, (ii) when investment income
and capital gains accrue, and (iii) when benets are received.
Given that there are three points at which it is possible to levy tax, there are several
basic tax policy combinations. Some are more common and characterize theoretical
ideals for the tax system. If we take standard precautionary saving, its taxation regime
is represented by the triplet of letters: TTE. This means that there is taxation, (T) at
the rst two stages and tax exemption, (E) at the third one. In other words, savings
are not tax exempt and capital income is taxed when it accrues. Once the savings plus
interest is then withdrawn this is not considered as taxable income. On the other hand,
for forced saving through a pay-as-you-go scheme, we have EET even though then the
second stage is a bit particular as the return is notional and equal to the growth of the
economy. Finally, private pensions are in most countries subject to the EET regime thus
benetting from a edge relative to standard precautionary saving. Money contributed
by employers and employees as well as investment income and capital gains accrued to
the fund are not taxed.
From a economic perspective the discussion on what should be the ideal triplet is
in any event not very instructive. What matters are the rates of taxation and in nal
analysis the overall tax burden. Historically, these regimes have emerged for a variety
of reasons which are mostly related to issues of tax law. For instance the income tax
exemption of the employers contribution to a pension fund on behalf of an employee is
justied by the fact that it is not an considered as incomeby tax law. This view relies
on di¤erent arguments. For instance it is not considered as income because employees
have no discretion on how to spend it.1 Furthermore, tax laws often requires that income
has to be taxed at the time it is e¤ectively perceived.
1The same argument applies to empoyershealth insurance contributions.
2
In the public economics literature the favorable tax treatment of pension savings
has been questioned from two standpoints. The rst concerns the e¢ cacy of such
favorable provisions at stimulating saving and ensuring adequate and sustainable levels
of retirement incomes. The second pertains to the economic rationale of those provisions.
We shall adopt the latter perspective, which leads to two questions. First, why is
standard saving subject to TTE, namely to double taxation? And then why is retirement
pension saving exempted from double taxation, and further why is its taxation often
deferred to the third stage of the process? This rst question refers to the literature
on expenditure versus income taxation. The second question is about the suitability
of introducing distortions between various saving products. What makes retirement
saving di¤erent from precautionary saving or saving for one childrens education? We
shall analyze those two issues in turn.
2.1 TEE or TTE
The choice between TEE and TTE amounts to the choice between a consumption and
an income tax. With TTE, capital income is taxed, and future consumption is taxed
more heavily than current consumption. Under TEE capital income is not taxed. The
consumption vs. income taxation is an old and prominent issue in optimal tax theory.
Historically this question has rst been dealt with in a Ramsey setting where all
taxes are linear; see Atkinson and Sandmo (1980). The main insight can be explained
in the simple case in which there are two periods and labor is supplied in the rst only.
The optimal tax results then imply that if rst- and second-period consumption were
equally substitutable for leisure, a consumption tax would be e¢ cient (capital income
should not be taxed). If second-period consumption is more complementary with leisure,
it should bear a higher tax. In that case the tax on capital should be positive. However,
this does not in general imply that capital and labor incomes be taxed at exactly the
same rates. To sum up, the optimal policy is in general neither TEE nor TTE and
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which of these regimes is preferable is not clear.
Things become clearer when we drop the assumption that all taxes are restricted
to be linear and adopt the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) approach which allows for a
nonlinear taxation of income. Then, if both present and future consumption are sep-
arable from leisure, a consumption tax will be optimal. There is no need of capital
income taxation. However besides the assumption of separability, this result assumes
that the only source of heterogeneity is labor productivity. If instead individuals dif-
fer in other characteristics such as their survival probability, time preference or initial
endowment then the tax on capital income is not in general equal to zero.2 Diamond
(2009) lists a number of cases under which capital income ought to be taxed, thus
departing from Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem. These include nonseparable preferences, het-
erogenous preferences, uncertain future earnings, the di¢ culty to distinguish capital
income from entrepreneurial earnings, borrowing constraints, di¤erent initial wealth,
limited tax tools.
To illustrate this point, consider a simple two period model with two agents (i = 1; 2)
who di¤er in their productivity w and their survival probability . We reasonably
assume that the agent with the higher productivity is also the one with the higher
probability of surviving through the second period (w1 < w2; 1 < 2). The e¢ cient
structure of taxation has to be self-selecting. Consequently, the government has to make
sure that the individuals with the higher income and the higher survival probability does
not mimic the other individuals who will benet from the tax policy.3
Expected utility of individual i is given by
Ui = u(ci)  v(`i) + iu(di);
where ci is rst period consumption; di second period consumption; `i; labor supply,
and i survival probability. In the absence of government intervention, with a zero
2See Cremer et al. (2003) and Cremer (2003).
3We concentrate on the case where this incentive constraint is binding. Roughly speaking this is that
case when productivity is the dominant source of heterogeneity.
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interest rate, and with perfect annuity markets implying a rate of annuity return 1=i,
the individuals budget constraint is given by
ci + idi = wi`i = yi:
The functions u and v are respectively strictly concave and convex. The problem of the
government is to maximize the following Lagrange expression
$ =
2X
i=1
ni

u(ci)  v

yi
wi

+ iu(di) + (yi   ci   idi)

+

u(c2)  v

y2
w2

+ 2u(d2)  u(c1) + v

y1
w2

  2u(d1)

;
where  is the multiplier associated to the revenue constraint and  the multiplier
associated to the self-selection constraint.
From the FOCs with respect to c2; y2 ;and d2 one obtains the optimal conditions:
u0(c2) = u0(d2) = v(y2=w2)=w2: These are the famous non-distortions at the top condi-
tions. Di¤erentiation with respect to c1; y1 , and d1 yields the following FOCs
u0(c1)    
n1
u0(c1) = 0
u0(d1)    2
n11
u0(d2) = 0
  v0

y1
w1

=w1 + +

n1
v0

y1
w2

=w2 = 0:
Rearranging these conditions and using 1 < 2, we obtain
u0(d1)
u0(c1)
=
1  2n11
1  n1
< 1;
and
v0(y1=w1)
u0(c1)
=
w1 +

n1
v0(y1=w2)w1=w2
+ n1u
0(c1)
< w1:
To obtain the last inequality we use the single crossing property.4 In words, these
4Which implies
v0(y1=w1)
w1
<
v0(y1=w2)
w2
:
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expressions imply that we have a tax on both saving and earnings of individuals of type
1. Consequently, it is not desirable to exempt saving from taxation in this context.
Arguments in favor of capital income taxation, namely in favor of TTE, are summa-
rized by Banks and Diamond (2012). In their survey paper they also cover the so-called
new dynamics public nance that generally concludes to the need of taxing capital
income besides labor income.
2.2 The exception of pension saving
Granted that saving ought to be taxed twice at rates to be determined, there remains
the question of why make an exception for pension saving. In other words, why to de-
part from neutrality among the di¤erent saving motives? Is there something special in
retirement that does not exist in the need to nance long term care, childrens education,
or any lifetime risks? One should keep in mind that private pensions tax expenditures
represent huge amounts of government revenue and are redistributively regressive. Re-
gressive because clearly low-income individuals do not contribute to private pensions or
at best very little. The costs in terms of foregone tax revenue are also not negligible. In
Australia, Canada and the UK, pensions tax incentives cost about 4.5 per cent of total
tax revenues.5
Among the arguments we nd in the literature, we retain the following. First, pen-
sions would cover the risk of mortality in the absence of annuities. Second, pension funds
would be invested in long term projects, which are essential for steady growth. Third,
tax breaks on private pensions would be a substitute for the progressive withdrawal of
governments in nancing public pensions for the middle class.
These arguments are not convincing. If the concern were to protect retirees against
the risk of mortality, a more e¤ective policy would be to directly target the organization
of the annuity markets. Currently, they are dramatically lacking, which is a problem
5Whitehouse (2009).
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at a time where most pensions are of the dened-contribution type. As to the second
argument, it is not clear that pension funds are invested in long-term or risky ventures
compared to other saving products. Finally, the last argument is a political economy
one. To be relevant one has to show that the amounts of these tax expenditures would
not have been better used keeping the public pensions at their previous levels.
2.3 Rationale for tax deferment
There is an argument that could justify not taxing pensions in the rst two stages
but just in the last one; it is a behavioral argument. Empirical and experimental
studies have shown that individuals tend to undersave for retirement. The reasons
are multiple: myopia, underestimation of survival probabilities, and duality of selves
that make individuals favor immediate gratication over long term concerns. Towards
those behaviors the government can be lead to subsidize and not tax pension savings
at the rst two stages and to catch up at the third stage. This argument could explain
the triplet EET. Recent research has underlined various inadequacies of the standard
discounted utility model as a descriptive representation of behavior.
Agents report a gap between their long-run goals and their short-run behavior. This
has important implications for their economic choices and leads to phenomena like
procrastination and undersaving. This gap between long-run and short-run preferences
leads to the important conceptual question of whether the government should give
priority to the long-run time preferences, at the expense of instant tastes. In other words,
should the present individuals choices be corrected to make them time consistent. It
is widely agreed upon that the government should paternalistically give priority to long
term concerns.
Not surprisingly, individuals will ex post be grateful to the government for having
forced them to act according to their long-run concerns. To illustrate this idea, we adopt
a two-period static model with work in the rst period and retirement in the second.
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The technology is linear so that both interest and wage rates are given. Individuals save
part of their earnings for their consumption in retirement. We rst look at the case of
a identical individuals. Their utility can be written as
U = u(c)  v(`) + u(d);
where c is rst period consumption; d, second period consumption; `; labor supply;
 a time preference factor and ; a survival probability. The functions u and v are
respectively strictly concave and convex.
Assume that in period 1 individuals uses a value of  =  < 1 even though his true
preference is 1. They thus maximizes
U = u(w`  s)  v(`) + u

Rs


;
where w is the wage rate; R, the interest factor and s, saving; R= is the return of an
annuity. The FOCs of this problem are
u0(c)  u0(d)R = 0;
u(c)w   v0(`) = 0:
These laissez faire conditions have to be distinguished from those of the rst-best
u0(c)  u0(d)R = 0;
u(c)w   v0(`) = 0:
Comparing these expressions shows that dFB > dLF : in the laissez faire, the second
period consumption is too small. To decentralize the rst-best, we have two alternative
policies. One can simply transfer resources from the rst to the second period in a
lump-sum way, which is close to a public pension scheme. Another policy consists in a
subsidy on saving at rate (1  ), that is nanced by a lump sum tax.
This model can be easily extended to a setting where individuals di¤er in productiv-
ity and in their degree of shortsightedness (discount factor) . Those two characteristics
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are not observable. Shortsighted individuals may not save enoughfor their retirement
because their myopic selfemerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made.
The optimal policy will consist of a non linear earning tax and a non linear capital
income subsidy that achieves two objectives: reaching the second-best optimal level of
saving and redistributing income across individuals with di¤erent characteristics.
2.4 EET or TEE
We have just seen that EET can be preferred over TEE in case of myopia. There are
other arguments that are in favor of TEE. One of them is presented by Romaniuk (2013)
who shows that the TEE regime is risk-taking neutral, while the EET system can a¤ect
risk-taking, at least in the case of DC funds. Another benet of the TEE regime is that
it allows the government to collect revenue earlier. (see Auerbach, 2012). These two
arguments calls for broadening the use of the TEE regime.
At this point we should recall that in reality the choice is not between TEE or
EET but between TtE or TtE, where the small case t means that the tax rate, though
positive, will be lower than that of the income tax. In that respect the Mirrlees Review
recommends TtE or the Rate of Return Allowance (RRA) method, which taxes the
annual returns to capital as they occur, but in this case only partially, allowing a
deduction for the normal rate of return and thus leaving only supernormal returns in
the tax base.
3 Public pensions and taxation
Whereas the literature turning around the optimal triplet to be used to tax private
pensions is relatively old, the literature studying the relation between (public) pensions
and taxation are much more recent. This literature is closely related to work on age
related taxation and on the impact of retirement decision on the design of social security.
The starting idea behind this literature is that nonlinear taxes and pensions are two
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instruments that closely interact and ought to be combined. For a long time, they were
studied in quite di¤erent settings. Optimal income taxation was developed in a rather
static framework with rather sophisticated tools whereas the design of optimal pensions
schemes was analytically simple but relying on temporal dimensions, specically the
career prole and the age of retirement. As noted by Diamond (2009), Cremer et al.
(2008b) and Chone and Laroque (2015) the desirable approach consists into combining
the optimal design of pensions and taxes in a single model.
To illustrate this view we consider a two period model. In the rst period individuals
work and save. They also pay an earning tax that nances redistribution and public
pension benet. The tax impacts their intensive margin that is their weekly labor
supply. In the second period, they work a certain number of years and then retire.
While individuals are working, their weekly labor supply is endogenous. In other words
they face both an intensive and an extensive margin labor supply decision. Further the
pension benet may depend on the length of retirement (retirement age). If it does not,
this means that an additional year of work does not increase the level of the pension,
which discourages prolonging work. In words, in the second period the combined e¤ect
of taxation and pension rule is to discourage both the length of the work week and the
age of retirement. Henceforth, the tax level and the pension have to be accordingly
adjusted. With such a setting, following Lozachmeur (2006) and Cremer et al. (2008a)
we obtain that the income tax is going to be higher in the rst period than in the second.
As shown by Gruber and Wise (1999) and many others existing pensions along
with the income/payroll tax generate an implicit tax on prolonged activity that has to
be taken into account when designing an optimal social security system. This can be
illustrated by the following example of an individual who in the second part of his life
has to choose his age of retirement, z.
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We keep our two period model with identical individuals maximizing their utility
U = u(c) + u(d)  v(z) =
u(w(1  )  s) + u (Rs+ wz(1  ) + (1  z)a(z))  v(z)
where a(z) is the pension benet that depends on the retirement age. One normally
expects that a0(z) > 0. The FOCs are
u0(c) = Ru0(d);
v0(z) = u0(d)w(1 );
where
 =  +
a(z)  (1  z)a0(z)
w
: (1)
In the literature (see Gruber and Wise, 1999),  is called the implicit tax on prolonged
activity. Expression (1) shows that there is a downward distortion on retirement that
comes not only from the payroll tax  , but also from the incentive towards early re-
tirement that underlines some pension systems. Let a denote a positive constant. We
consider three canonical regimes
1. a(z) = a so that  =  + aw ;
2. a(z) = a1 z so that  =  ;
3. a(z) = wz1 z so that  = 0;
Regime 1 implies that the distortion comes not only from the tax but also from
the non actuarial neutrality of the pension system. As shown by Gruber and Wise,
this is a feature of many social security systems. In regime 2 the pension system is
actuarially neutral, but  continues to be positive because second period labor income
is taxed. Finally, regime 3 corresponds to an earning related benet pension that is fully
neutral. This distinction can be applied to private pensions as well. Typically dened
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contributions pensions tend to correspond to regime 3 and dened benets pensions
comprise features inducing early retirement. Cremer et al. (2004, 2008a) show that
full neutrality is generally not optimal in a second best setting. Even with a nonlinear
tax, informational asymmetries call for a distorted retirement age, as long as the social
objective implies some redistribution.
So far we have just described the impact of a given pension scheme. Let us now look
at policy design. Assume that the government can use two di¤erent tax rates,  in the
rst period and  in the second period. Consider a utilitarian social welfare function
ini [u(wi(1  )  si) + u (Rsi + wizi(1  ) + (1  zi)a(zi))  v(zi)]
subject to the revenue constraint
ini [wi( + zi)  (1  zi)a(zi) = 0] :
Cremer et al. (2004, 2008a) show that (i)  >  > 0 and (ii) a(zi) is a combination of
regimes 2 and 3. In words, property (i) says that the tax rate on labor income is larger
in the rst period than in the second one but both rates are strictly positive.
Clearly in the rst best one should have i = 0, but in the second best with linear
taxes and liquidity constraint or alternatively with nonlinear taxes and limited infor-
mation, some distortion is unavoidable. People have to retire earlier than they would
do in the rst-best or in a pure laissez-faire setting.
4 Conclusion
This note has reviewed the general principles of pension taxes. It has analyzed the
theoretical foundations of why pension incomes ought to be taxed specically and how
contributions to private pensions should be treated. To do this, one has to distinguish
between public and private pensions. Regarding private pensions, we have reviewed
and discussed the various regimes which can be observed in reality. Historically, these
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regimes have emerged for a variety of reasons which are mostly related to issues of tax
law; little attention has been devoted to their economic foundations. We have shown
that the key issue is whether or not savings ought to be taxed in general and whether
pension saving ought to be treated di¤erently from other forms of saving. While the
taxation of capital income is subject to debate, even among economists, a number of
recent contributions have shown that from on optimal tax perspective it is in general
not desirable to fully exempt the returns of savings from taxation. The main arguments
rely on multi-dimensional heterogeneity and/or uncertainty. However, the optimal tax
rate on capital income typically di¤ers from that on labor income. Turning to the need
of a specic regime for pension savings, we have shown that the arguments traditionally
given for their full tax exemption are not convincing. However, a tax deferment may
well be desirable mainly for paternalistic reasons. It is well known that unless forced
by the pension system individuals tend not to save enough for their retirement. This
is in line with recent insights achieved in behavioral economics which have shown that
intertemporal choices may by tainted by various types of myopia.
The design of public pensions cannot be separated from the one of taxation. Both
systems have to be designed jointly and like in any optimal tax problem, informational
asymmetries are of crucial importance. The distortions implied by pension systems
depend both on the benet formula and on the age specic taxation of labor income.
We have shown that they occur both at the extensive margin (early retirement) and
the intensive margin. While these distortions and in particular the implicit tax on
continued activityhas often been criticized we have shown that it may be unavoidable
in a second-best setting.
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